Showing posts with label Nebula. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Nebula. Show all posts

Sunday, August 05, 2012

Arthur C. Clarke, Rendezvous with Rama (1972) SFMW 65

'On a billion television screens, there appeared a tiny, featureless cylinder, growing rapidly second by second. By the time it had doubled its size, no one could pretend any longer that Rama was a natural object. Its body was a cylinder so geometrically perfect that it might have been turned on a lathe - one with centres fifty kilometres apart. The two ends were quite flat, apart from some small structures at the centre of one face, and were twenty kilometres across; from a distance, when there was no sense of scale, Rama looked almost comically like an ordinary domestic boiler.' (Loc. 191-95)

In this manner, Arthur C. Clarke introduces the titular Big Dumb Object  (BDO) of his Hugo and Nebula award winning 1972 novel Rendezvous with Rama.

One of the features of Clarke's fiction is his re-orientation of aspects of human arrangements that tradition has sanctified, and the interpolation of plausible extrapolations from current research. Rendezvous with Rama is no different, with its representation of polygamy (in all combinations; Loc. 586-88) and appealing, but effectively enslaved, superchimps or 'Simps':
Their rearing and education had probably cost as much as that of the average spaceman, and they were worth it. Each weighed less than thirty kilos and consumed only half the food and oxygen of a human being, but each could replace 2.75 men for housekeeping, elementary cooking, tool-carrying and dozens of other routine jobs (Loc. 776-78)
For all this, and as its title suggests, the main interest of the work resides in Clarke's description of the BDO itself. His description of the crew of the survey vessel Endeavour's exploration of Rama's interior is striking, and often suspenseful:
And now he understood the purpose of those mysterious trenches, the Straight Valley and its five companions; they were nothing less than gigantic strip-lights. Rama had six linear suns, symmetrically ranged around its interior. From each, a broad fan of light was aimed across the central axis, to shine upon the far side of the world. (Loc. 1279-81)
However, subsequent to the appearance of the organic automata that cleanse and maintain the BDO during its journey, the text loses much of its mystery, although it retains a good deal of interest:
'What we failed to take into account was the possibility of non-biological survival. If we accept Dr Perera's very plausible theory, which certainly fits all the facts, the creatures who have been observed inside Rama did not exist until a short time ago. Their patterns, or templates, were stored in some central information bank, and when the time was ripe they were manufactured from available raw materials - presumably the metallo-organic soup of the Cylindrical Sea. Such a feat is still somewhat beyond our own ability, but does not present any theoretical problems. We know that solid state circuits, unlike living matter, can store information without loss, for indefinite periods of time. 'So Rama is now in full operating condition, serving the purpose of its builders - whoever they may be.' (Loc. 2762-68)
Ultimately, readers may be disappointed to glean little from the work that can provide them with satisfactory answers to the two questions that exercise the minds of the crew of the Endeavour: 'Who were [the Ramans] -- and what went wrong?' (Loc. 501). This may be asking the wrong questions of Rendezvous with Rama, as one senses that Clarke's purpose was to invite the reader to capture and reflect on the sense of wonder developed within his description of the BDO's geography in this excellent addition to the SF Masterworks series, and take it with them beyond their reading of the novel, and into their own lives:
The nature and the purpose of the Ramans was still utterly unknown. They had used the solar system as a refuelling stop - as a booster station - call it what you will, and had then spurned it completely, on their way to more important business. They would probably never even know that the human race existed; such monumental indifference was worse than any deliberate insult. (Loc. 3294-96)

Saturday, October 29, 2011

Gregory Benford, Timescape (1980) SFMW 27

Gregory Benford's 1980 Nebula award-winning novel imagines what scientists of the late 1990s would do if they wished to send a message back in time to the early 1960s to warn their historic peers of the catastrophic effect that long-chain molecule pesticides have had upon the environment, and to thereby change the course of history.

Expressed in so reductive a manner, the text sounds preposterous and juvenile, but is in fact both nuanced, sophisticated and at time hugely enjoyable if the reader is prepared to suspend judgement on the absolute truth-value of the physics it contains. Benford's novel has often been praised for its hard science and plausible explanations of how tachyons could theoretically travel faster than light and, if aimed at the correct coordinates at the right time could theoretically send messages backwards or forwards in time.

Benford's work contains a number of dramatic set pieces: the discovery of the note in the bank vault proving that messages have been received; Greg Markham's fevered dream state as he perishes in an air crash in the original timeline whilst resolving crucial equations; the fact that Kennedy survives the assassination attempt which killed him in our reality as a consequence of a student interrupting Oswald whilst fetching a journal featuring an article by Gordon Bernstein discussing his discovery of the 'spontaneous resonance effects' - Markham's transmissions from the future - and the inevitable meeting of the two protagonists in an alternate future that they have both been instrumental in constructing.

The latter conceit is that which precipitates the final sequence of occurrences depicted in the gripping last 30 pages of the novel and elevates the work above the status of being merely 'interesting but worthy'. It is as clever a re-imagining of such a hackneyed historic event as a reader is ever likely to encounter.

The novel does have its weaknesses. Beyond Bernstein in the 1960s and Markham in the 1990s, Benford and his sister-in-law Hilary Foister Benford, whom the author credits as having 'contributed significantly to the manuscript' in a special acknowledgment, have a tendency to indulge themselves in some broad but generally unconvincing characterisations in the persons of their extensive ensemble cast. The bit-part characters' contributions to the plot are slight and their antics can give the work something of a 'soap opera' feel at times. The novel could easily have lost at least a quarter of its 400 pages without impacting on its thematic development in any way. For example, whilst it's nice to meet Marxist philosopher Herbert Marcuse (p. 173), and read a peon of praise in honour of Philip K. Dick's The Man in the High Castle (p. 213) you have to wonder what they are doing in the book.

Overall, Timescape nevertheless ranks as one of the most enjoyable entries in the SF Masterworks series, and despite the Benfords' tendency towards the linguistically gaudy (some of the laboured puns the characters are forced to opine can grate, for example) the work contains some thought-provoking, powerfully conveyed ideas:

'Behind the equations were immensities of space and dust, dead but furious matter bending to the geometric will of gravity, stars like match heads exploding in a vast night, orange sparks that lit only a thin ring of child planets. The mathematics was what made it all; the pictures that men carried inside their heads were useful but clumsy, cartoons of a world that was as subtle as silk, infinitely smooth and varied. After you had seen that, really seen it, the fact that worlds could exist within worlds, that universes could thrive within our own, was not so huge a riddle. The mathematics buoyed you' (p. 176).

'He had a sudden sense that time was here, not a relation between events, but a thing. What a specifically human comfort it was to see that time as immutable, a weight you could not escape. Believing that, a man could give up swimming against this river-run of seconds and simply drift, cease battering himself on time's flat face like an insect flapping against a blossom of light' (p. 410).

'No matter how the days moved through them, there always remained the pulse of things coming, the sense that even now there was yet still time' (p. 412).

Sunday, August 30, 2009

Daniel Keyes, Flowers For Algernon (1966) SFMW #25

“Who’s to say that my light is better than your darkness? Who’s to say death is better than your darkness? Who am I to say?” (p. 175)

A 1960 Hugo-winning short story that was later expanded into a Nebula-winning novel in 1966, the first-person narrative of Daniel Keyes’ work in its long form begins with Charlie Gordon (IQ: 68) reflecting to the best of his current abilities on the possibility that the procedure to be performed on him may reconnect him with his family. The reasons as to why he is no longer in contact with them are unclear at this stage, but powerfully described later in the work: ‘I dint see my mother or father or my littel sister Norma for a long long long time. Maybe their ded to. Dr. Strauss askd me where they use to live. I think in brooklin. He sed they will see if maybe they can find them[…] If the operashun works and I get smart maybe Ill be abel to find my mom and dad and sister and show them. Boy woud they be serprised to see me smart just like them and my sister’ (pp. 4, 9)

The first signs of Charlie’s improved cognitive abilities manifest themselves within the confines of his workplace, a bakery: ‘I worked the dough-mixer and everybody was surprised epeshully Frank Reilly. Fanny Birden got exited because she said it took Oliver 2 years to learn how to mix the dough right and he went to bakers school. Bernie Bate who helps on the mashine said I did it faster then Oliver did and better. Nobody laffed. When Gimpy came back and Fanny told him he got sore at me for working on the mixer.’ (p. 25)

Throughout the work, Keyes considers the emotional strain of Charlie’s development from within and without. External observers such as Dr. Strauss, one the project’s co-ordinators advise him that “The more intelligent you become the more problems you’ll have, Charlie. Your intellectual growth is going to outstrip your emotional growth. And I think you’ll find that as you progress, there will be many things you’ll want to talk to me about. I just want you to remember that this is the place for you to come when you need help.” (p. 33)

The treatment Keyes envisages being capable of augmenting cognitive development combines psychosurgery, enzyme injections and psychosomatic programming (p. 48), and Charlie’s scholarly development is rapid: ‘My studies are going well. The university library is my second home now. They’ve had to get me a private room because it takes me only a second to absorb the printed page, and curious students invariably gather around me as I flip through my books.’ (p. 68)

Disappointment awaits him, however, in his discovery that the average academic’s cordon of knowledge is extremely narrow. He quizzes an economics professor on the political implications of economic policies adopted by the American government between the 1918 and 1939: ‘He listened quietly, staring off into space, and I assumed he was collecting his thoughts for an answer, but a few minutes later he cleared his throat and shook his head. That, he explained apologetically, was outside his field of specialization[…] The same thing happened when I tried to discuss Chaucer with an American literature specialist, questioned an Orientalist about the Trobriand Islanders, and tried to focus on the problems of automation-caused unemployment with a social psychologist who specialized in public opinion polls on adolescent behaviour. They would always find excuses to slip away, afraid to reveal the narrowness of their knowledge.’ (pp. 68, 69). Similarly, Charlie finds it ‘terrifying’ (p. 104) to hear academics confess to ignorance of vistas of their own disciplines, let alone those that lay outside them, and is soon led to conclude that even his own mentors are ‘Frauds[…] They had pretended to be geniuses. But they were just ordinary men, working blindly, pretending to be able to bring light into the darkness. Why is it that everyone lies? No-one I know is what he appears to be.’ (p. 105)

Keyes, who clearly has a rather jaundiced view of the academic life, has his protagonist proclaim himself to have ‘learned that intelligence alone doesn’t mean a damned thing. Here in your university, intelligence, education, knowledge have all become great idols. But I know now there’s one thing you’ve all overlooked: intelligence and education that hasn’t been tempered with human affection isn’t worth a damn.” (p. 173)

Things also take a rapid turn for the worse at the bakery as Charlie's IQ burgeons: ‘And so it went[...] It had been all right as long as they could laugh at me and appear clever at my expense, but now they were feeling inferior to the moron. I began to see that by my astonishing growth I hade made them shrink and emphasized their inadequacies. I had betrayed them, and they hated me for it.’ (p. 74).

Algernon’s capabilities quickly develop to the point where Strauss feels the need to remind him that if he is to communicate effectively, he must pitch his discourse at a level his academic audience can understand: ‘Strauss again brought up my need to speak and write simply and directly so that people will understand me. He reminds me that language is sometimes a barrier instead of a pathway. Ironic to find myself on the other side of the intellectual fence.’ (p. 79)

Charlie liberates Algernon, the mouse upon which his treatment was successfully conducted (or so it appeared) in animal trials, at a dinner held to mark the success of the experiment: ‘“Come on,” I said, “We’ll get out of here together.” He let me pick him up and put him into my jacket pocket. “Stay in there quietly until I tell you.”[…] “I’ll just get my things packed,” I said, “And we’ll take off – just you and me – a couple of man-made geniuses on the run.”’ (pp. 114, 115)

After some prevarication, Charlie decides to visit his father, now estranged from his mother, who is running a barber’s shop. Not surprisingly, his parent does not recognize him: ‘How could I tell him? What was I supposed to say? Here, look at me, I’m Charlie, the son you wrote off the books? Not that I blame you for it, but here I am, all fixed up better than ever. Test me. Ask me questions. I speak twenty languages, living and dead; I’m a mathematical whiz, and I’m writing a piano concerto that will make them remember me after I’m gone. How could I tell him? How absurd I was sitting in his shop, waiting for him to pat me on the head and say “Good boy”. I wanted his approval, the old glow of satisfaction that came to his face when I learned to tie my own shoelaces and button my sweater. I had come here for that look in his face, but I knew I wouldn’t get it.’ (p.131)

There still moments of calm at the centre of the novel where Charlie can both look back at what he was and forward to what he may become, although the rising fear of a reciprocal decline in his powers cannot be quelled: ‘I have often reread my early progress reports and seen the illiteracy, the childish naïveté, the mind of low intelligence peering from a dark room, through the keyhole, at the dazzling light outside. In my dreams and memories I’ve seen Charlie smiling happily and uncertainly about what people around him are saying. Even in my dullness I knew I was inferior. Other people had something I lacked – something denied me. In my mental blindness, I had believed it was somehow connected with the ability to read and write, and I was sure that if I could get those skills I would have intelligence too[…] That’s the problem, of course. I don’t know how much time I have. A month? A year? The rest of my life? That depends what I find out about the psychophysical side-effects of the experiment.’ (pp. 139, 146)

It is difficult to state with precision when Charlie’s decline commences as Keyes draws the reader into his protagonist’s attempt to explain to himself what the grey areas that begin to encroach on the margins of his consciousness may signify. On the one hand, he senses himself to be ‘on the edge of it. I sense it. They all think I’m killing myself at this pace, but what they don’t understand is that I’m living at a peak of clarity and beauty I never knew existed. Every part of me is attuned to the work. I soak it up into my pores during the day and at night – in the moments before I pass off into sleep – ideas explode into my head like fireworks. There is no greater joy than the burst of solution to a problem’. (p. 167) On the other (as is this, perhaps, where the regression begins?), he wishes to convince himself that he has ‘gone as far as [he] can on a conscious level, and now its down to those mysterious operations below the level of awareness.’ (p. 168)

Either way, however, he is aware of the fact that his experience has, for a time at least, allowed him to rise above those ‘souls withered from the beginning, and doomed to stare into the time and space of every day[…] Whatever happens to me, I will have lived a thousand normal lives by what I might add to others not yet born.’ (pp. 160-61, 167)

The decline of Charlie’s powers is rapid. The decline of his self-study into the ‘Algernon-Gordon Effect’ concludes emphatically that ‘ARTIFICIALLY-INDUCED INTELLIGENCE DETERIORATES AT A RATE OF TIME DIRECTLY PROPORTIONAL TO THE QUANTITY OF THE INCREASE.’ (p. 177)

‘Algernon died two days ago[…] Dissection shows that my predictions were right. Compared to the normal brain, Algernon’s had decreased in weight and there was a general smoothing out of the cerebral convolutions as well a deepening and broadening of brain fissures.’ (pp. 179-180)

‘I put Algernon’s body into a small metal container and took him home with me. I wasn’t going to let them dump him into the incinerator. It’s foolish and sentimental, but last last night I buried him in the back yard. I wept as a put a bunch of wild flowers on the grave.’ (p. 180)

‘October 3 - Downhill. Thoughts of suicide to stop it all now while I am in control and aware of the world around me. But then I think of Charlie waiting at the window. His life is not mine to throw away. I’ve just borrowed it for a while, and now I’m being asked to return it.’ (pp. 193-94).

The power of Daniel Keyes’ best-known work resides in its ability to provoke the reader to consider how their own cognitive abilities shape their view of the world. Do we perceive everything that we are capable of perceiving? Are we even capable of ascertaining what we may be missing? Would it be possible to connect with that which seems to elude us if we could better ourselves? And if we could, what imperceptible potentialities may reside beyond, receding into an infinite realm of experience, denied to us in stages? Are our own powers waxing or waning? Are we any more or any less ourselves, or our lives of more or less value as a consequence?

Saturday, April 18, 2009

Ursula Le Guin, The Dispossessed (1974) SFMW 16

“I have something they want,” he said. “An idea. A scientific theory. I came here from Anarres because I thought that here I could do the work and publish it. I didn’t understand that here an idea is the property of the State. I don’t work for a State. I can’t take the money and the things they give me. I want to get out. But I can’t go home. So I came here.” (pp. 242-43)

The physicist Shevek flees his native Anarres, an independent planet settled by former citizens of Urras, in order to continue his work on the ‘theory of the General Field in temporal physics’ (p. 283) having elicited little interest in his endeavours on his isolationist home planet: “I must explain to you why I have come to you, and why I came to this world also. I came for the idea. For the sake of the idea. To learn, to teach, to share in the idea. On Anarres, you see, we have cut ourselves off. We don’t talk with other people, the rest of humanity. I could not finish my work there. And if I had been able to finish it, they did not want it, they saw no use in it. So I came here.” (p. 284). In contrast, Shevek is enthusiastically received on Urras as consequence of the fact that it is anticipated that he will make a significant scientific breakthrough whilst residing there, and that the Urrasti will subsequently be able to capitalize upon it: ‘if you provide the theory, the unification of Sequency and Simultaneity in a general field theory of time, then we’ll design the ships. And arrive on Terra, or Hain, or the next galaxy, in the instant we leave Urras!’ (pp. 73-74).

After long periods of inactivity and distraction, Shevek does finally make significant progress with his work. Rather bravely, considering the suspension of disbelief required in the reader, Le Guin chooses to describe the physicist's moment of revelation, wisely choosing to focus on his self-observed response to the discovery: ‘the fundamental unity of the Sequency and Simultaneity points of view became plain; the concept of interval served to connect the static and the dynamic aspects of the universe[…] The moment was gone; he saw it going. He did not try to hold on to it. He knew he was part of it, not it of him. He was in its keeping’ (pp. 231-32).

As a resolution to his investigations seems to draw nearer, Shevek becomes more disillusioned with Urrasti life, and comes to distrust his hosts’ motives for sheltering him: “what they want[…] is the instantaneous transferal of matter across space. Transilience. Space travel […] without traversal of space or lapse of time. They may arrive at it yet; not from my equations, I think.” (p. 283)

Shevek’s disenchantment is largely a result of the time he has had to study the disparities between the harsh life on the desert world of Anarres and the easy existence enjoyed by the ruling classes of the verdant world of Urras. The people of Anarres are ‘members of a community, not elements of a collectivity, they were not moved by mass feeling; there were as many emotions as there were people. And they did not expect commands to be arbitrary, so they had no practice in disobeying them’. (p. 7). Acknowledging the tenets of the physicist Odo, the founder of Anarresti society, that ‘power inheres in a centre’ (p. 50), the desert-dwellers ‘keep free’ by practicing their social, economic and political arrangements anarchistically. On Urras, Shevek soon comes to understand that ‘the lure and compulsion of profit was evidently a much more effective replacement of the natural initiative than he had been led to believe’ (p. 70), and comes to question every element of the order of the things on the world on which he finds himself a guest: ‘they told Shevek with pride that the competition for scholarships to Ieu Eun was stiffer every year, proving the essential democracy of the institution. He said, “You put another lock on the door and call it democracy.”’ (p. 108)

The physicist can make little sense of the capitalist structure he is suddenly immersed in: [Shevek] ‘tried to read an elementary economics text; it bored him past endurance, it was like listening to somebody interminably recounting a long and stupid dream’ (p. 109), and is physically and morally shocked the by waste of resources and human endeavour in the plethora of goods that are available to buy, characterizing the shops as containing ‘acres of luxuries, acres of excrement’ (p. 110). In contrast to the citizenry of Urras, Shevek reflects that on Anarres 'our men and women are free, possessing nothing they are free. And you the possessors are possessed. You are all in jail. Each alone, solitary, with a heap of what he owns. You live in prison, die in prison. It is all I can see in your eyes – the wall, the wall!' (p. 190)

Finally, Shevek comes to realize that he too is nothing more than a commodity whilst he remains on Urras: ‘You are aware, then, that you’ve been bought?[…] Call it co-opted, if you like. Listen. No matter how intelligent a man is he can’t see what he doesn’t know how to see. How can you understand your situation, here, in a capitalist economy, a plutocratic-oligarchic State? How can you see it, coming from your little commune of starving idealists up there in the sky?’ (p. 113)

The physicist’s slow recognition of the alien economic conditions constraining him stands in stark contradistinction to the secondary motive that brought Shevek to Urras: ‘I want my people to come out of exile[…] I want solidarity, human solidarity. I want free exchange between Urras and Anarres. I worked for it as I could on Anarres, now I work for it as I can on Urras.’ (p. 116). He nevertheless manages to find satisfaction in the research in itself: ‘Work is done for the work’s sake. It is the lasting pleasure of life. The private conscience knows that’ (p. 125). It should not be concluded from Shevek’s comment that work on has an individualistic rather than a communitarian bias conceptually: ‘To assert, by his talent, the rights of any citizen in any society: the right to work, to be maintained while working, and to share the product with all who wanted it. [These are] the rights of an Odonian and of a human being.’ (p. 228)

Indirectly, the narrative gradually discloses the fact that Shevek’s concerns have a basis in fact, and also infer that the protagonist has something of a mythical-prophetical association within the world-view of the inhabitants of Urras. A government offician, Pae, collects Shevek, who is insensible as a consequence of the consumption of an excess of alcohol to which he is unaccustomed, from a party thrown by his sister Pae, to whom Shevek fled having bolted from the university compound. ‘I don’t care what he sees. We don’t want him seen. Have you been reading the birdseed papers? Or the broadsheets that were circulating last week in Old Town, about the ‘Fore-Runner’? The myth – the one who comes before the Millennium – “A stranger, an outcast, an exile, bearing in empty hands the time to come”. They quoted that. The rabble are in one of their damned apocalyptic moods. Looking for a figurehead. A catalyst. Talking about a general strike. They’ll never learn. They need a lesson all the same. Damn rebellious cattle, send ‘em to fight [the imperalist wars on] Thu, it’s the only good we’ll ever get from them’ (p. 192). This is not a view shared by the Urrasti population in its entirety, however, as Shevek discovers on becoming embroiled in an uprising in the planet: “Do you know that when people want to wish each other luck, they say, ‘May you get reborn on Anarres!’” (p. 243)

It emerges that the Urrasti political underground admire Anarres as ‘an experiment in non-authoritarian communism that […] has survived for a hundred and seventy years’ (p. 282). At a council meeting, one of the Urrasti revolutionaries recounts some of the teaching of the founding mother of Anarres society, Odo: ‘“For we each of us deserve everything, every luxury that was ever piled in the tombs of the dead Kings, and we each of us deserve nothing, not a mouthful of bread in hunger. Have we not eaten while another starved? Will you punish us for that? Will you reward us for the virtue of starving while others ate? No man earns punishment, no man earns reward. Free your mind of deserving, of the idea of earning, and you will begin to be able to think”. They were of course Odo’s words from the Prison Letters, but spoken in the weak, hoarse voice they made a strange effect, as if the man were working them out word by word himself.’ (p. 295).

It is difficult to read this passage and not think of Antonio Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks, and similarly many passages in the text evoke the spirit of Leon Trotsky’s concept of permanent revolution: ‘We are not subjects of a State founded upon law, but members of a society founded upon revolution. Revolution is our obligation: our hope of evolution. “The Revolution is in the individual spirit, or it is nowhere. It is for all, or it is nothing. If it is seen as having any end, it will never truly begin”. We can’t stop here. We must go on. We must take the risks’ (p. 296); 'There is nothing on Urras that we Anarresti need! We left with empty hands, a hundred and seventy years ago, and we were right. We took nothing. Because there is nothing here but States and their weapons, the rich and their lies, and the poor and their misery. There is no way to act rightly, with a clear heart, on Urras. There is nothing you can do that profit does not enter in, and fear of loss, and the wish for power.’ (p. 285)

Finally, there is an enviromentalist parable to be discerned within The Dispossessed. Whilst the planet Anarres features a good deal of desert terrain as a consequence of its evolution, the planet Earth, which exists within the novel’s conceptual universe, has become a desert due to the activity of its inhabitants, with drastic consequences in terms of the political structure that has to be adopted in order to ensure species survival, and a concordant restriction of the liberties afforded to the individual. It is interesting to consider this outcome, and specifically the ways in which the assumption of choices which appear in the short term to promulgate the expression of individual identity but which over a longer period of time can serve to constrain the freedom of the individual disastrously, in parallel with the analysis of disparate forms of politico-economic forms found elsewhere in the work. 'My world, my Earth, is a ruin. A planet spoiled by the human species. We multiplied and gobbled and fought until there was nothing left, and then we died. We controlled neither appetite, nor violence; we did not adapt. We destroyed ourselves. But we destroyed the world first. There are no forests left on my Earth. The air is grey, the sky is grey, it is always hot. It is habitable, it is still habitable – but not as [Urras] is. This is a living world, a harmony. Mine is a discord. You Odonians chose a desert; we Terrans made a desert[...] We had saved what could be saved, and made a kind of life in the ruins, on Terra, in the only way it could be done: by total centralization. Total control over the use of every acre of land, every scrap of metal, every ounce of fuel. Total rationing, birth control, euthanasia, universal conscription into the labour force. The absolute regimentation of each life towards the goal of racial survival.' (pp. 286-87)

Regardless of the whether the reader happens to agree with the sentiments they contain – and this reader indubitably does concur with them - the somewhat mechanical political theorizing within the The Dispossessed serves to imbue long tracts of the work with all of the pliability characteristic of a rainforest hardwood: ‘With the myth of the State out of the way, the real mutuality and reciprocity of society and individual become clear[…] The Odonian society was conceived as a permanent revolution, and revolution begins in the thinking mind.’ (p. 274)

Indigestible passages such as this may serve to diminish the impact of the work as a theoretical treatise for me, but they appear to have enthused legions of academics to study the work in granular detail (see below). The Dispossessed has inspired a considerable amount of scholarly secondary literature and commentary from a number of disciplines. There is a noteworthy share of philosophy tucked away in the text. Early on in the work, we encounter one of Zeno’s paradoxes (‘Achilles and the tortoise’) ‘“Why can’t it reach the tree?” said a girl of ten. “Because it always has to go half of the way that’s left to go,” said Shevek’ [as a child] (p. 27). Heraclitus puts in an appearance too: ‘You shall not go down twice to the same river’ (p. 48)

The Dispossessed contains a number of observations based on simple humanist considerations, and these are for me some of the highlights of the novel. ‘There are souls, [Shevek] thought, whose umbilicus has never been cut. They never got weaned from the universe. They do not understand death as an enemy; they look forward to rotting and turning into humus’ (p. 154). Also: ‘“If you can see a thing whole […] it seems that it’s always beautiful. Planets, lives… but close up a world’s all dust and rocks. And day to day, life’s a hard job, you get tired, you lose the pattern. You need distance – interval. The way to see how beautiful earth is, is to see it as the moon. The way to see how beautiful life is, is to see it from the vantage point of death”’ (p. 158). ‘Fulfilment, Shevek thought, is a function of time. The search for pleasure is circular, repetitive, atemporal[…]It comes to the end and has to start over. It is not a journey and return, but a closed cycle, a locked room, a cell’ (p. 275); “It isn’t changing around from place to place that keep you lively. It’s getting time on your side. Working with it, not against it” (p. 256); ‘If you evade suffering you also evade the chance of joy. Pleasure you may get, or pleasures, but you will not be fulfilled. You will not know what it is to come home’. (p. 275); ‘The thing about working with time, instead of against it, he thought, is that it is not wasted. Even pain counts’ (p. 276). Finally, and with a reference to E.M. Forster, perhaps: ‘To [Shevek], a thinking man’s job was not to deny one reality at the expense of the other, but to include and to connect. It was not an easy job’ (p. 235)

Le Guin has some rather laboured things to say about gender and sexuality. Not only is Urras the crucible of capitalism’s evils, we also learn, perhaps with some weariness, that it is unashamedly misogynistic. There are, for example, no female scientists: ‘[Women] can’t do the maths; no head for abstract thought. You know how it is, what women call thinking is done with the uterus! Of course, there’s always a few exceptions, God-awful brainy women with vaginal atrophy[…] I’ve always said[…] that girl technicians properly handled could take a good deal of the load off the men in any laboratory situation. They’re actually defter and quicker than men at repetitive tasks, and more docile.’ (pp. 63-64)

The human sentiment iterated and sifted over in The Dispossessed is somewhat moving and struck a chord with me, especially when it interfaces with the novel’s philosophical leanings. The author’s musings on the nature of relationships and fidelity are touching: ‘We came, [Shevek’s life-partner,] Takver thought, from a great distance to each other. We have always done so. Over great distances, over years, over abysses of chance. It is because he comes from so far away that nothing can separate us. Nothing, no distances, no years, can be greater than the distance that’s already between us, the distance of our sex, the difference of our beings, our minds; that gap, that abyss that we bridge with a look, with a touch, with a word, the easiest thing in the world. Look how far away he is, asleep. Look how far away he is, he always is. But he comes back, he comes back, he comes back…’ (p. 265). ‘Loyalty, which asserts the continuity of past and future, binding time into a whole, is the root of human strength; there is no good to be done without it.’ (p. 276)

Reading the text some thirty-five years after its composition, there is an intriguingly contemporary social media reading of The Dispossessed to be discerned: ‘Nothing is yours. It is to use. It is to share. If you will not share it, you cannot use it’ (p. 26) On his arrival on Urras, Shevek’s is of the opinion that ‘To deny is not to achieve. The Odonians who left Urras had been wrong, wrong in their desperate courage, to deny their history, to forego the possibility of return. The explorer who will not come back or send back his ships to tell his tale is not an explorer, only an adventurer; and his sons are born in exile’ (p. 76). 'The strongest, in the existence of any social species, are those who are most social. In human terms, most ethical. You see, we have neither prey nor enemy, on Anarres. We have only one another. There is no strength to be gained from hurting one another. Only weakness.' (p. 183) Regidly in keeping with these ideas, Le Guin portrays the Anarresti as socially bisexual: ‘Shevek was pretty definitely heterosexual and Bedap pretty definitely homosexual; the pleasure of it would be mostly for Bedap. Shevek was perfectly willing, however, to reconfirm the old friendship’ (p. 144)

'My people were right, and I was wrong, in this: we cannot come to you. You will not let us. You do not believe in change, in evolution. You would destroy us rather than admit our reality – rather than admit that there is hope! We cannot come to you. We can only wait for you to come to us' (p. 288); 'Men cannot leap the great gaps, but ideas can.' (p. 283)

Ursula Le Guin’s ambitious, Nebula-winning meditation on political, social, economic and personal arrangements is most commonly referred to as The Dispossessed, with its frank subtitle (‘An Ambiguous Utopia’) seldom being acknowledged. That the implied theoretical value to the reader of this much-discussed work should be so starkly undermined by its author prior to their even having begun to read it explodes for me the idea that Le Guin was seriously interested in presenting a compelling fictive account of alternative social structures. However, this has not stopped professional literary critics and exponents of the soft sciences championing their interpretations of the work’s various themes in support of disparate theoretical agendas. I remain unconvinced by the work’s utopian elements, and ambivalent about its ambiguities. It is nevertheless an engaging addition to the SF Masterworks library.